By getting out of the way and letting councils and communities run their own affairs we can restore civic pride, democratic accountability and economic growth -and build a stronger, fairer Britain. It's the end of the era of big government: laying the foundations for the Big Society (Pickles, quoted in Inside Government, 2010: np) [A]ll contemporary expressions of territory… are, to varying degrees, punctuated by and orchestrated through a myriad of trans-territorial networks and relational webs of connectivity (MacLeod and Jones 2007: 1186) 
Introduction
There are few individuals who have had an economic development policy named after them. Mary Portas became one such person when twelve successful Portas Pilot towns were announced by the UK Coalition Government in May 2012. Publicprivate partnerships in Bedford, Croydon, Dartford, Bedminster (Greater Bristol), Liskeard, Margate, Market Rasen, Nelson, Newbiggin-by-the-Sea, Stockport, Stockton-on-Tees and Wolverhampton would receive a small government grant, as well as advice and training from government and 'industry leaders' such as Portas herself. This, it was hoped, would stimulate "innovative ideas about how to transform their local high street into a social place, bustling with people, services and jobs" (Inside Government 2012: np) . Portas, of course, has become a well-known individual in the UK, from her career in retailing, most noticeably at Harvey Nichols, her appearances on television in Mary Queen of Shops and subsequent follow-ons, and 3 the independent review into the future of high streets in the UK that she was commissioned to write by the UK Coalition Government.
The Portas Review was published at the end of 2011. This set out twenty-eight 'practical' recommendations, all geared towards increasing consumer spending and lowering vacancy rates on the high street. They will get "town centres running like businesses", Portas (2011: 17) claims, helping them fight long-standing competition from out-of-town and on-line retailers as well as the post-2008 recession. While much of what was recommended was about altering existing methods of financing the management of high streets, the report does note a number of existing successes. One is particularly interesting in the context of this edited collection on the issue of territorial governance. As Portas (2011: 21) 
notes:
There is one model, already in place, which has begun to make important inroads:
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), where local businesses contribute to realising a jointly produced plan, funded by an uplift in business rates. 4 more of a strategic partnership to shape the thriving high streets of the future I want to see (Portas 2011: 22) The Portas Review argued that these new 'super-BIDs' would be the kinds of initiatives the Coalition Government should want to see emerge under the Localism Act. She has not been alone in linking BIDs to the Coalition's localism agenda. Her words echo a number of other commentators such as regeneration practitioner Chris Brown (2011: np) who recently blogged that "BIDs are perfectly positioned for localism being designed at a neighbourhood scale." Portas (2011: 22) , however, goes further than most by suggesting that the Government: should look at how duly-constituted BIDs could be enabled to exercise the new community rights to buy assets and run services provided by the Localism Act.
Provided that they can demonstrate local support and accountability, the new SuperBIDs should have the same rights as local authorities to use Compulsory Purchase Orders and enter and upgrade strategic properties, bringing empty property back into use. Super-BIDs should also be able to lead business-led neighbourhood planning exercises to develop a vision for their high streets.
The Coalition Government published its response, High Streets at the Heart of our
Communities the following March (Department for Communities and Local Government 2012) . Despite claiming that " [w] e fully support these recommendations" (Department for Communities and Local Government 2012: 9) , it took only some on board. One was the establishment of the Portas Pilot Towns, of course. With regards to BIDs, the response shied away from the creation of 5 Porter-esque 'super-BIDs'. It instead committed to setting aside just £500,000 from which prospective BIDs could request a loan to aid the costs of establishment. Not quite the ringing endorsement of which Portas and others in the UK BID community had been hoping. Nevertheless it was a clear signal from the Coalition Government that they saw the economic and political value in BIDs. This example, therefore, speaks to how a particular pre-existing 'model', in the words of Portas (2011) , of territorial governance has been reinterpreted and repackaged by certain policy-makers and practitioners as embodying the beliefs, initiative they want to encourage emerging in the context of the systemic dismantling and restructuring of all levels of government (Clarke and Cochrane 2013; Deas, 2013) . BIDs are then in the process of being cast as a model for territorial governance, and not for the first time in their histories of course, as it has been moved across national borders, from one location to another (Cook 2008; Hoyt 2006; Ward 2006) .
In light of these recent developments with regards to Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), this chapter will critically examine the development, rolling-out and 6 evolution of BIDs in the UK. In so doing, this chapter is organised into five sections.
The second section sets out how to understand the relational and territorial geographies behind the introduction of BIDs in the UK as a form of territorial governance. It draws on the urban policy mobilities research that has emerged in recent years that seeks to bring together traditional urban political studies where the emphasis is on 'territory' with more recent work on relational understandings of 'the urban'. The third section introduces BIDs and sets out the model's global geographies and histories. This reveals its Canadian origins, the work done to construct it as a US model, and the range of actors whose labour was involved in creating the conditions where BIDs could be introduced into the UK. The fourth section turns to the experiences of BIDs, first in England and Wales and then more recently in Scotland. This reveals the model's introduction into a growing number of towns and cities over the last decade. It ends by exploring the roles being played by BIDs in the context of the financial crisis and the UK Coalition Government's programmes of austerity and New Localism. In conclusion the chapter makes two points in relation to the objectives of this edited collection. First, that theorizing territorial governance in the context of an increasingly inter-dependent context requires an approach that is sensitive to both networks and territories. If it were ever enough to account for change in the nature of urban politics on the basis of analysis generated solely from within cities and the countries of which they are part, then that time has surely passed (Ward 2011) . Second, the Business Improvement District 'model' that was established in England and Wales and then Scotland during the early-to-mid 2000s reflected the contexts both through which it had travelled and into which it was being introduced. Territorial models that are moved from one geographical location to another are adapted, modified, transformed and translated 7 as part of that movement, with the result that they are made to 'fit' with the wider institutional and political environment with which they will be asked to work (and, in turn, potentially transforming that very same institutional and political environment through their presence).
Moving Models
[W]hat is commonly defined as 'urban politics' is typically quite heterogeneous and by no means referable to struggles with, or among, the agents structured by some set of social relations corresponding unambiguously to the urban (Cox 2001:756) Underpinning many of the accounts of the 'old urban politics' of collective consumption and social reproduction and those on the 'new urban politics' of economic development is a territorial understanding of the urban, where it is a bounded entity, a city or a town, often the geographical remit of local government.
Work in recent years, however, has sought to re-think what, and where, we mean by the urban. Indeed, scholars such as Neil Brenner (2004) and Andy Jonas (2006) have shown that the urban is connected to, and even made up of, a multiplicity of spatial scales. Other scholars have sought to bring territorial understandings of the urban into dialogue with recent understandings of place as being open, porous and inter-connected (Amin 2004 (Amin , 2007 Massey 2005) . More concretely, this work has begun to explore the complex ways in which boundaries and fixities interact with inter-urban networks and mobilities to make and re-make the urban and urban policy (see, for example, Allen and Cochrane 2007; Jacobs 2012). Such understandings of cities as sites "of intersection between network topologies and territorial legacies" (Amin 2007: 103) show the elements of elsewhere that goes into the assembling of 'urban politics'. Elements of other city's experiences, models, and success stories for example.
This bringing together of urban territoriality and relationality can be found in the recent work on urban policy mobilities which examines the ways in which 'best practice' models are constructed and mobilised between different cities (see, for instance, Ward 2006; Peck and Theodore 2010; McCann and Ward 2010 McCann 2011; Temenos and McCann 2013) . These studies, as Temenos and McCann (2013: 345) note, focus on the "tension between policy as fixed, territorial, or place-specific, on the one hand, and dynamic, global and relational on the other" (see also McCann and Ward 2010) . As part of this, the work has three particularly useful insights. First, it illustrates the diverse set of actors and 'informational infrastructures' involved in the circulation of ideas, expertise and models.
Informational infrastructures are, in the words of McCann (2008: 12) , made up of "institutions, organizations and technologies that, in various ways, frame and package knowledge about best policy practices, successful cities, and cutting-edge ideas and then present that information to specific audiences". Perhaps the best known of these technologies are best practice guides (Moore 2013) , conferences (Cook and Ward 2012) , and study tours (Cook and Ward 2011; González 2011; Cook et al. 2014) . These are important, not least because they actively connect some people and some places. They anoint and represent some models as 'best practice' and help lubricate their movement, while downplaying or ignoring others. Following on from the above, the third point made in this literature is that the movement of policy is never a literal copying and pasting from place A to place B. As Peck and Theodore (2010: 170) note, "mobile policies rarely travel as complete "packages", they move in bits and pieces -as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models -and they therefore "arrive" not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation". The assembling of ideas and their reterritorialisation is once again a messy, selective and contingent process (Baker 2013 ). This much we know. Yet for all the research conducted thus far, we know little about the longer-term experiences of (once) mobile policies. What happens to policies several years after they have 'arrived'? How are they embedded (and re- Third, the money raised through the tax -or levy as many practitioners and policymakers call it -is not redistributed throughout the city, region or nation but is 'ringfenced' to be spent on issues within the district. focus on managing public spaces rather than overseeing property-led redevelopment projects (Mallett 1994) .
While Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are not necessarily defined by the services they provide, these are the most outwardly visible element to what they do, particularly to the general public. Although they undertake a wide variety of activities there are common services that BIDs tend to focus on (Ward 2007; Mitchell 2008 ). These are:
(i) Public space cleaning and maintenance, in terms of providing basic services and monitoring the appearance of the streetscape;
13
(ii) Securing public spaces and businesses, often through form of hiring security guards to coordinate with local police and installing surveillance technologies; and (iii) Marketing the BID area and organising events to compete with other areas inside and outside of the city (for an example see Figure 2 ).
For people on the street, BIDs are frequently personified by the presence of 'clean teams', horticulturists and security-guards-come-goodwill-ambassadors (Ward 2006; Cook 2010) . However, it is important to note that not every BID focuses on all three service areas, not all employ street personnel, and fewer still place equal emphasis on the three service domains. Nonetheless, these partnerships are heavily involved in the day-to-day management of the public spaces of business districts. (Hoyt 2006; Ward 2006 Ward , 2011 Cook, 2008; Cook and Ward, 2012; Peyroux et al. 2012) .
BIDs in the UK developed out of the Town Centre Management (TCM) movement that grew substantially in the 1990s (Cook 2008) . Promoted by the ATCM and the Conservative Government of the time, TCM involved public-private partnerships forming and governing city and town centres. They were often involved in cleaning and marketing services (similar to BIDs) and were financed by local government and voluntary contributions from businesses within the area.
TCM's introduction was accompanied by rhetoric asserting the private sector's ability to bring efficiency, innovation and market-sensitivity to governance structures and ultimately business profitability to their localities (Cook, 2008 (Cook, , 2009 ).
Nevertheless, a number of its supporters grew frustrated with one of the fundamental features of TCM. That is, the voluntary nature of business contributions which was seen to encourage inadequately small and unpredictable incomes for TCM schemes (despite often being accompanied by grants from local councils). 'Freeriding' by businesses -that is, enjoying the benefits of services paid for other businesses without contributing themselves -was viewed as a widespread problem (Medway et al. 1999 (Medway et al. , 2000 . Both the small income generated by TCM schemes together with the considerable time and effort that staff needed to dedicate to encouraging donations -so called 'begging bowl' activities -were seen to impact negatively on the quality and quantity of services provided.
Simultaneously news of the growing numbers of North American Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) and their supposed successes increasingly reached senior officials at the ATCM. Indeed, the 1996 World Congress in Coventry, coorganised by the International Downtown Association and the ATCM, was a pivotal moment in 'showcasing' BIDs to ATCM and Whitehall officials. At the event, US BID officials were invited to speak of their 'successes' in transforming dirty, unsafe, emptying and unprofitable downtowns into thriving and profitable places that consumers and businesses wanted to be (Cook 2008) . These achievements were, in no uncertain terms, attributed to the presence and power of their BID financed through a mandatory levy on property owners. Over the years that followed, transAtlantic dialogue continued, whether through personal communication, visits, or conferences (see, for example, Travers and Weimar 1996) . As part of this, the apparent success and transferability of BIDs became increasing vivid to the ATCM and the New Labour Government who came into power in 1997. Yet, it was certainly not the Canadian experience that captured the attention or imagination.
Nor was it the trans-US experience. Rather, it was the experience of a small number of downtown BIDs in the east coast cities of New York City (primarily), Philadelphia and Washington DC that became sites of 'best practice' and study tours (and, of course, it is the east coast that officials are visiting later in 2013). A number of BID officials from these cities were repeatedly brought to the UK at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s to advise government officials in England and Wales (Ward 2006 (Ward , 2011 Cook 2008 In developing the national legislation and regulations and the subsequent push to Of course, the Business Improvement District (BID) model did not stay the same as it was prepared for introduction into the UK. The most important change was in who was responsible for paying the mandatory levy. While property owners are the ones who pay the BID levy in the United States, in England and Wales the New Labour Government decided that it was simpler to make business occupiers pay the levy instead. This was because in the UK business occupiers already paid business rates, and property owners did not. Therefore, it would reduce administrative 'burdens' if the BID levy was collected by local councils as a surcharge of business rates (Cook 2008 ). The BID levy would then be ring-fenced and transferred to the BIDs. As you can imagine, this raised questions about equity, as there were concerns that property owners may benefit from increases in rental and property prices as a result of BID operations without making any financial contributions to the BID. Here 'free-riding' is once again a problem but in a different form. In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament also followed this logic by making the occupiers contribute but provisions were made in the legislation that to allow individual BIDs also place a mandatory levy on property owners alongside business occupiers should they wish. These provisions, however, have only been drawn on by two 'live' BIDs -the Inverness BID and the Clackfirst BID in Clackmannanshirewhere property owners are levied alongside occupiers.
In order to operate, Business Improvement Districts in England, Wales and Scotland must pass a 'dual key test' in a ballot where each business that is due to pay the levy in the proposed district gets a vote. First, the BID must receive a 'yes' vote from a majority of voters. Second, all the business that voted yes must all comprise a higher ratable value (i.e. estimated property rental value) than all those who voted against it (Cook 2009 ). So in England and Wales it is business occupiers in the 20 district who can vote. In Scotland, if property owners are included in those who pay the levy, they must also be given a vote. A further difference in the voting procedures is that in Scotland, unlike south of the border, BID ballots require a 25% turnout in number and rateable value, a requirement that was put in place to safeguard the 'democratic mandate' of BIDs. In England, Wales and Scotland, BIDs are time-limited to a maximum of five years (with the overwhelming majority operating for five years). If they seek to continue beyond this, they must be reelected through another renewal ballot (which is identical to a new ballot). It is through references to these voting procedures that proponents of BIDs argue they are both accountable and democratic. Such claims, however, have been questioned by critics who have pointed out that BIDs are only accountable and democratic to business occupiers and not the wider community (Hochleutner 2003; Briffault 2010-11) .
The evolution of Business Improvement Districts in the UK
As many a Business Improvement District (BID) practitioner and scholar will tell the UK continues to be somewhat uneven.
As noted above, in order to operate BIDs must pass the 'dual key test'.
How, then, have they faired? Until the end of 2012 a total of 263 ballots took place in the United Kingdom of which 79% (208) passed the test, 21% (44) failed and one which will be discussed later was declared void (see Figure 3) . Success at the ballot box is therefore not guaranteed. In Glasgow city centre, for example, a proposed BID led by its Chamber of Commerce was narrowly rejected in the ballot with 48% in favour by turnout and 59% in favour by rateable value. The legislation in Scotland as well as England and Wales allows BID proposers to go back to the ballot box if rejected. This was an opportunity not taken in Glasgow, but eight other rejected schemes did so. Of these, five failed once more while three passed the test (in Altham, Liverpool and Sutton). Eastbourne with 13%. The former was voted in and the later was rejected, but it entirely feasible that a BID can be voted in with just over 25% of eligible voters taking part. In total, 72% of ballots had a figure between 20% and 40% of eligible voters voting 'yes'. Again these figures should be viewed with caution. However, we should be equally cautious when looking at much of the rhetoric that asserts that
BIDs are the voice of business in their locality (Rasasinghe, 2013) when the majority of BIDs in the UK received a 'yes' vote from less than 40% of eligible voters (Cook, 2009 Little is known about the effects of the recession on the organisation and the strategies of Business Improvement Districts. What we do know is that the UK has experienced a number of businesses including high street retailers going into administration, closing down or streamlining their operations. The cost of the recession to the UK's retailers has recently been estimated to be around £23 billion (Thomas, 2013) . In the face of this, BID supporters have urged those associated with BIDs to be cautious but also to see BIDs as mechanisms through which local economic development can stabilise and then grow (Reilly, 2009, Houstoun, n.d.) .
Nevertheless, businesses are finding themselves under significant financial pressures.
Looking to cut their costs it might reasonably be expected that businesses look at their discretionary costs -such the annual figure "more focused and flexible forms of governance than large municipal bureaucracies" (Levy 2001: 129) . However, an increasing number of BIDs will be going for renewal votes over the next few years and this will require them to demonstrate their value 28 added to the businesses who pay the levy. Local governments will continue to see their budgets reduced and thus they are likely to have less and less resources to fund BID activities and services. At best this would seem to be a complex and contradictory environment in which UK BIDs will, for the foreseeable future, operate in.
Conclusion
The focus of this edited collection has been on the challenges and the opportunities The borrowing from elsewhere embodied in the trans-national and transurban mobility of the Business Improvement District model underscores the extent to which there is a need to theorise 'the urban' as 'both a place (a site or territory)
and as a series of unbounded, relatively disconnected and dispersed, perhaps sprawling activities, made in and through many different kinds of networks stretching far beyond the physical extent of the city' (Robinson 2005: 763) . While issues of territory remain important in urban and regional studies -as other chapters in this collection have demonstrated -the way in which they are important and how best to capture their importance continues to be something of an intellectual challenge in the context of an increasingly inter-connected urban world.
